Introduction
Moral philosophy often seeks to explain how to make the right choices. These choices are, in turn, circumscribed by a range of possibilities. It follows that, before we can deliberate on what constitutes the right choice for a given situation, we need to establish our field of possibilities, to ascertain what can and cannot be conceived and considered prior to our judging and acting. These enabling conditions are what make any normative theory or applied ethics possible, yet they receive surprisingly little attention in the literature. To address this interpretive gap, this project analyses the dynamics of moral impossibility, with a view to explaining why some ethical conflicts become intractable. Most argument-based responses to moral conflict involve persuasion within a given context, with little effect outside their own normative framework. MI displaces precisely such shared order, thus opening up new response strategies.
MI poses a challenge to existing normative theories. In utilitarianism (as famously criticised by Bernard Williams), any possibility is open to rational evaluation. In deontology, some actions are considered wrong, but not impossible. MI, instead, can take place before or despite deliberation: in the selection and creation of possibilities themselves. Taking this phenomenon seriously means not only that the objects of moral reflection need to be modified, but also that the overall scope of normative theories is narrower than moral experience. This project aims to fill this gap, showing how MI, far from being an exception or aberration, is an ordinary experience, which defines the nature of choice and of fundamental moral commitment.
Forms of moral impossibility
I propose the following categorization of MI into three types:
(A) ‘The Unconceived’: What we never consider, because it lies outside the range of our moral thinking, feeling, and imagination.
(B) ‘Moral Incapacity’: What we consider possible, but then find ourselves incapable of doing (the term is Bernard Williams’s)-
(C) ‘The Unthinkable’: What we become aware of, because it is presented to us, but we cannot take as a real possibility for ourselves, or for anyone (from Raimond Gaita).
(A) ‘The Unconceived’: What we never consider, because it lies outside the range of our moral thinking, feeling, and imagination.
(B) ‘Moral Incapacity’: What we consider possible, but then find ourselves incapable of doing (the term is Bernard Williams’s)-
(C) ‘The Unthinkable’: What we become aware of, because it is presented to us, but we cannot take as a real possibility for ourselves, or for anyone (from Raimond Gaita).
Work packages
WP1 Descriptive
What is moral impossibility?
The WP aims to delineate the field of MI as a distinctive domain of morality and ethical enquiry. This consists in unifying and refining the existing discussions relevant to MI. The objectives are to i) provide a coherent and distinctive conception of this domain and ii) to expand ethical reflection and discussion beyond deliberation and traditional argument-based debate. These will show that awareness of MI is crucial in both delimiting and qualifying the scope of choice.
Questions:
(a) What constitutes a moral impossibility?
(b) What causes change from moral possibility to impossibility and vice versa, sometimes manifested as moral ‘conversion’ in matters such as attitudes towards minorities, dietary practices and environmental protection? Besides seeing MI as defining the individual, I shall seek a link between individual and socially determined/contextual causes.
Questions:
(a) What constitutes a moral impossibility?
(b) What causes change from moral possibility to impossibility and vice versa, sometimes manifested as moral ‘conversion’ in matters such as attitudes towards minorities, dietary practices and environmental protection? Besides seeing MI as defining the individual, I shall seek a link between individual and socially determined/contextual causes.
WP2 Normative
(When) is moral impossibility desirable?
Questions:
(a) Can we define a structural difference between good and bad MI? Including whether we can distinguish cases of MI resulting from reflection or moral commitment (e.g. euthanising a suffering but curable patient), from cases of MI caused by conformity, limited imagination, or carelessness.
(b) In the case of moral impossibilities where there is consensus on the object being morally undesirable (e.g. hate crime), is it right to silence and restrict access to the ideas leading to it (e.g. a racist website) to avoid normalising and legitimising dangerous possibilities?
(a) Can we define a structural difference between good and bad MI? Including whether we can distinguish cases of MI resulting from reflection or moral commitment (e.g. euthanising a suffering but curable patient), from cases of MI caused by conformity, limited imagination, or carelessness.
(b) In the case of moral impossibilities where there is consensus on the object being morally undesirable (e.g. hate crime), is it right to silence and restrict access to the ideas leading to it (e.g. a racist website) to avoid normalising and legitimising dangerous possibilities?
WP3 Applied
How does considering MI change our understanding and resolution of intractable moral conflict?
The WP aims to contribute to applied ethics and social/political philosophy by using the above frameworks to reconfigure particular instances of radical ‘disagreement’ as moral ‘impossibilities’, a move which hopes to change the way we address intractable conflicts, whose persistence otherwise undermines our capacity to develop coordinated responses to crises like climate change or rights violations.
Question:
How does MI change our approach to intractable moral conflict? Particularly when such conflict is a) based on fundamental values (e.g. the value of life); and b) unexplainable by appeal to individual or social differences alone. As MI is by its nature often hidden, and hence particularly insidious, bringing it to light modifies the understanding of conflict. The findings and methods of WPs 1&2 will be used to analyse contemporary problems in applied ethics.
Question:
How does MI change our approach to intractable moral conflict? Particularly when such conflict is a) based on fundamental values (e.g. the value of life); and b) unexplainable by appeal to individual or social differences alone. As MI is by its nature often hidden, and hence particularly insidious, bringing it to light modifies the understanding of conflict. The findings and methods of WPs 1&2 will be used to analyse contemporary problems in applied ethics.