Journal articles
Forms of moral impossibility
European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2022, pp 361-373
The article that started the whole project: an overview of some forms of moral impossibility, with a focus on the impossibility of evil.
An important yet often unacknowledged aspect of moral discourse is the phenomenon of moral impossibility, which challenges more widely accepted models of moral discussion and deliberation as a choice among possible options. Starting from observations of the new possibilities of anti-immigrant attitudes and hate crimes which have been described by the press as something being “unleashed,” the paper asks what it means for something to enter or not the sphere of possibility in the moral sense, and whether it is ever desirable for something to remain or be pushed back outside the realm of the morally possible. Three forms of moral impossibility are identified: the unconceived, the unthinkable, and moral incapacity. Through the discussion of a stark fictional example of moral impossibility, the paper concludes that while the category of moral impossibility cannot settle disagreement, it sheds light on some of the most fundamental aspects of moral life
An important yet often unacknowledged aspect of moral discourse is the phenomenon of moral impossibility, which challenges more widely accepted models of moral discussion and deliberation as a choice among possible options. Starting from observations of the new possibilities of anti-immigrant attitudes and hate crimes which have been described by the press as something being “unleashed,” the paper asks what it means for something to enter or not the sphere of possibility in the moral sense, and whether it is ever desirable for something to remain or be pushed back outside the realm of the morally possible. Three forms of moral impossibility are identified: the unconceived, the unthinkable, and moral incapacity. Through the discussion of a stark fictional example of moral impossibility, the paper concludes that while the category of moral impossibility cannot settle disagreement, it sheds light on some of the most fundamental aspects of moral life
If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
Animals, 2020 Jan, 10(1): 145
Discusses why some people do not even consider certain empirically-available options, for moral reasons. Applied to veganism and the consumption of animals.
Discussions about the ethics of buying and consuming animal products normally assume that there are two choices equally available to moral agents: to engage or not to engage in such behaviour. This paper suggests that, in some cases, the experience of those who refuse to participate in animal exploitation is not a choice, but a reconfiguration of their understanding of what animals, and the products made out of them, are. Such reconfiguration involves not seeing animals as something to eat, wear, control, etc. Hence, it is not always correct to speak of veganism as a choice: the reason being that, sometimes, the opposite does not present itself as a possibility.
Discussions about the ethics of buying and consuming animal products normally assume that there are two choices equally available to moral agents: to engage or not to engage in such behaviour. This paper suggests that, in some cases, the experience of those who refuse to participate in animal exploitation is not a choice, but a reconfiguration of their understanding of what animals, and the products made out of them, are. Such reconfiguration involves not seeing animals as something to eat, wear, control, etc. Hence, it is not always correct to speak of veganism as a choice: the reason being that, sometimes, the opposite does not present itself as a possibility.
Public articles
In this podcast, Olli Lagerspetz & Silvia Caprioglio Panizza, the two current Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellows (2022) at the Centre for Ethics discuss their EU-funded projects, the value of carrying them out at the Centre, and similarities between their philosophical interests. Silvia's project, Moral Impossibility: Rethinking Choice and Conflict (MIGHT), focuses on the scope of what is possible for the subject in a moral sense, and how the range of possibilities that we have available is important in determining what our choices are and mean, as well as in revealing our deepest moral commitments. In this conversation she outlines various forms of moral impossibility, with one extended example from animal testing, and applies the research question to other contemporary issues such as the war in Ukraine, concluding with further applications and interdisciplinary directions for the project. In his project, Philosophy as Cultural Self-Knowledge: R. G. Collingwood, Peter Winch and the Human Sciences (WC-CULT), Olli discusses the role of the humanities and social sciences. History is neither sacred memory nor litigation – as it too often seems in the present war – but targeted inquiries. As with philosophy, the value of the human sciences lies in that they enhance the self-knowledge and self-understanding of cultures and societies. Olli also talks about his finds in the posthumous Peter Winch and R. G. Collingwood Archives.
in progress
The limits of my world
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In this paper I’m interested in what shapes the limits of the world we can see, as Iris Murdoch put it, ‘in the moral sense of see’. Empirical and psychological boundaries limit what we can see every day. Moral boundaries, sometimes overlapping or coinciding with the empirical and psychological ones, also do that. But the latter are much less evident to see, and hence less acknowledged. |
Credit: Simone Busatto/Unsplash
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This paper defends the idea that limits to our vision, which do not coincide (although sometimes they do) with empirical and logical limits, are morally significant in more than one way: they are morally significant upstream, because often they are determined by moral factors such as values, principles, a general sense of the good life, of what is permissible, what is worth pursuing, and so on.
But they are also morally significant – and this applies to all boundaries, both those that are shaped by moral factors and those that are shaped by non-moral ones – downstream: first, what we can see is not just a collection of objects, facts, and already existent possibilities, but the limits of our vision is what gives the world we live in the specific shape it does. A range of items can be arranged in more than one ways, but the construction also depends on what is in the range. Conversely, working with a specific construction will select items that fit and leave out those that to not (I’ll come back to this). Hence the limits and the shape of my world go hand in hand.Second, our thinking about what to aim for and what to do occurs, more obviously, within the possibilities that are available to us, and less obviously, within the shape of the world that those possibilities allow.
If this is true, then the limits of our world are not just one morally significant factor among others, but one that we need to reckon with every time we discuss moral questions and consider moral situations. Questions such as ‘Why is my world delimited the way it is?’ ‘What factors contribute to these limits?’ and ‘Are there specific objects and possibilities that I should include or exclude?’ could and I suggest should be the starting point in discussions of morality, and illuminate the more familiar moral distinctions and theories we employ.
Moral possibilities and moral limits
The things that we can properly say we cannot do, think, or imagine are, broadly speaking, moral impossibilities: they lie outside of what presents itself as possible to the agent at a given time. Typically, these things present themselves as impossible because they strike us as too bad, or 'beyond the pale'. Yet there exist moral impossibilities that strike an external observer, and ourselves when we can see them, that seem to have the opposite object, such as the good action we cannot imagine, or the absolute good or beautiful discussed by Cora Diamond as a 'difficult of reality'. I propose to account for the reality of moral imopssibilities by focusing on the differences between two cases, and suggesting that there is a structural difference between them, which also brings about different consequences in the application of moral impossibility to action and reflection. Discussing the accounts by Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, Craig Taylor, and Dwight Furrow, I explore how our conception of what is good and what is not shapes and limits our world by limiting the possibilities for our thought, perception, emotion, imagination.
Conspiracy theories, distrust, and one possibility too many
Credit: Ehimetalor Akhere Unuabona/Unsplash
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When trust is present, something else is absent: recurrent doubt or continuous checking for signs that the other will do as expected are signs of lack of trust. Focusing on this aspect of trust, C. Thi Nguyen has proposed to understand it as an ‘unquestioning attitude’. In this paper, I draw no Nguyen’s contribution to extend the understanding of trust in negative terms – in terms of what we do not do – and apply this account of trust to conspiracy theorists, who on this view express distrust in expert-endorsed facts and positions by entertaining ‘one possibility too many’.
In the first part of this paper I consider the meaning and role of ‘possibility’ that is relevant for trust, its first personal nature, and the moral psychology of possibility in the moral domain. I then go on to apply the concept developed to different instances of trust, private and public, and observe how in all cases trust excludes, to varying degrees, certain possibilities from playing a role in the mind of the trustor. In the final section I consider the moral psychology of conspiracy theorists by looking at how the erosion of public trust operates through the introduction of heretofore unconsidered possibilities and the proliferation of ungrounded possibilities. |
Simone weil: defining the impossible
Simone Weil’s best known ideas, among which are attention, obedience, and decreation, have both an ethical and a metaphysical side. The normativity inherent in these concepts is striking, appealing, and disturbing. That’s because Weil presents them as what we all should aim at with (literally) all of ourselves, and at the same time as something impossible. Attention, its concomitant decreation and the ensuing obedience, are not part of our nature. If they succeed, it’s a matter of grace. This demand is the opposite of the widely accepted ‘ought implies can’ principle. For Weil, we ought to do what we cannot. ‘The good is impossible’ (Gravity and Grace).
On the other hand, Weil also tells us that as soon as we—impossibly—get a glimpse of the order of the world, it is impossible not to obey its demands. ‘Certain actions become impossible’ for us (‘The Love of God and Affliction’). This includes actions that are violent or harmful. The impossible, here, is what we might consider not morally desirable (if we had a choice). So what is impossible is both what we ought to strive for, and what we recognise as a real and desirable limit.
What is the real nature of Weil’s impossibility in its ethical role? Was Weil merely emphasising a difficulty, in the fist case of impossibility? And was she merely stressing a prohibition in the second? Neither of these interpretations capture what Weil was aiming for. In this paper I explore the meaning of impossibility in Weil, the idea that it may be built into the moral life, and the potential advantages of introducing this apparently paradoxical idea into moral thinking.
On the other hand, Weil also tells us that as soon as we—impossibly—get a glimpse of the order of the world, it is impossible not to obey its demands. ‘Certain actions become impossible’ for us (‘The Love of God and Affliction’). This includes actions that are violent or harmful. The impossible, here, is what we might consider not morally desirable (if we had a choice). So what is impossible is both what we ought to strive for, and what we recognise as a real and desirable limit.
What is the real nature of Weil’s impossibility in its ethical role? Was Weil merely emphasising a difficulty, in the fist case of impossibility? And was she merely stressing a prohibition in the second? Neither of these interpretations capture what Weil was aiming for. In this paper I explore the meaning of impossibility in Weil, the idea that it may be built into the moral life, and the potential advantages of introducing this apparently paradoxical idea into moral thinking.