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Publications

Academic and public articles
from the project so far

Journal articles
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Forms of moral impossibility
European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2022, pp 361-373

The article that started the whole project: an overview of some forms of moral impossibility, with a focus on the impossibility of evil.

An important yet often unacknowledged aspect of moral discourse is the phenomenon of moral impossibility, which challenges more widely accepted models of moral discussion and deliberation as a choice among possible options. Starting from observations of the new possibilities of anti-immigrant attitudes and hate crimes which have been described by the press as something being “unleashed,” the paper asks what it means for something to enter or not the sphere of possibility in the moral sense, and whether it is ever desirable for something to remain or be pushed back outside the realm of the morally possible. Three forms of moral impossibility are identified: the unconceived, the unthinkable, and moral incapacity. Through the discussion of a stark fictional example of moral impossibility, the paper concludes that while the category of moral impossibility cannot settle disagreement, it sheds light on some of the most fundamental aspects of moral life
READ IT HERE

​If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
Animals, 2020 Jan, 10(1): 145

Discusses why some people do not even consider certain empirically-available options, for moral reasons. Applied to veganism and the consumption of animals.

Discussions about the ethics of buying and consuming animal products normally assume that there are two choices equally available to moral agents: to engage or not to engage in such behaviour. This paper suggests that, in some cases, the experience of those who refuse to participate in animal exploitation is not a choice, but a reconfiguration of their understanding of what animals, and the products made out of them, are. Such reconfiguration involves not seeing animals as something to eat, wear, control, etc. Hence, it is not always correct to speak of veganism as a choice: the reason being that, sometimes, the opposite does not present itself as a possibility.
READ IT HERE

​Public articles
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The unthinkable and the unconceived
​LSE, The forum for philosophy

READ IT HERE
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Podcast

Moral impossibility and cultural self knowledge:
​joint MSCA interview with olli Lagerspetz

recorded for Philosophy Voiced

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Transcript

​In this podcast, Olli Lagerspetz & Silvia Caprioglio Panizza, the two current Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellows (2022) at the Centre for Ethics discuss their EU-funded projects, the value of carrying them out at the Centre, and similarities between their philosophical interests. Silvia's project, Moral Impossibility: Rethinking Choice and Conflict (MIGHT), focuses on the scope of what is possible for the subject in a moral sense, and how the range of possibilities that we have available is important in determining what our choices are and mean, as well as in revealing our deepest moral commitments. In this conversation she outlines various forms of moral impossibility, with one extended example from animal testing, and applies the research question to other contemporary issues such as the war in Ukraine, concluding with further applications and interdisciplinary directions for the project. In his project, Philosophy as Cultural Self-Knowledge: R. G. Collingwood, Peter Winch and the Human Sciences (WC-CULT), Olli discusses the role of the humanities and social sciences. History is neither sacred memory nor litigation – as it too often seems in the present war – but targeted inquiries. As with philosophy, the value of the human sciences lies in that they enhance the self-knowledge and self-understanding of cultures and societies. Olli also talks about his finds in the posthumous Peter Winch and R. G. Collingwood Archives.

in progress
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​Simone weil: defining the impossible

Simone Weil’s best known ideas, among which are attention, obedience, and decreation, have both an ethical and a metaphysical side. The normativity inherent in these concepts is striking, appealing, and disturbing. That’s because Weil presents them as what we all should aim at with (literally) all of ourselves, and at the same time as something impossible. Attention, its concomitant decreation and the ensuing obedience, are not part of our nature. If they succeed, it’s a matter of grace. This demand is the opposite of the widely accepted ‘ought implies can’ principle. For Weil, we ought to do what we cannot. ‘The good is impossible’ (Gravity and Grace).
On the other hand, Weil also tells us that as soon as we—impossibly—get a glimpse of the order of the world, it is impossible not to obey its demands. ‘Certain actions become impossible’ for us (‘The Love of God and Affliction’). This includes actions that are violent or harmful. The impossible, here, is what we might consider not morally desirable (if we had a choice). So what is impossible is both what we ought to strive for, and what we recognise as a real and desirable limit.
What is the real nature of Weil’s impossibility in its ethical role? Was Weil merely emphasising a difficulty, in the fist case of impossibility? And was she merely stressing a prohibition in the second? Neither of these interpretations capture what Weil was aiming for. In this paper I explore the meaning of impossibility in Weil, the idea that it may be built into the moral life, and the potential advantages of introducing this apparently paradoxical idea into moral thinking.  
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​Imaginative resistance and the statues we cannot stand

 Recent years have seen a growing debate around the toppling of statues once erected to celebrate individuals who, besides being political or military leaders, or precisely in those roles, were also guilty of various crimes. Only, those actions were not at the time publicly considered crimes; but they are now. Arguments both in favour and against the removal of statues point, among other things, to the intention and message of the statues, which takes us back to their context of production. I propose to think about this question using ideas introduced in the discussion of imaginative resistance: the difficulty we have, in fiction, in imagining that something we consider evil is good. We can imagine all sorts of counterfactuals, but the moral case seems different. Applied to the question of statues, artworks that celebrate an individual we find morally despicable cause similar resistance: such resistance can be understood, I suggest, as the impossibility of transporting ourselves into a context — here the context of production—where what we now think of as abhorrent or cruel was considered laudable or heroic. Upon this framework, I will consider the nature and ethical implications of such resistance.  
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